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Abstract: This paper investigates the relationship between money growth, inflation, and productive activity
in a general equilibrium model of search. The use of a multiple-matching technique, where trade frictions are
captured by limited consumption variety, allows us to study price determination in a search-theoretic
environment with divisible money and goods. In our basic framework, productive activity and matching in the
goods market are endogenized by a time allocation decision of work and shopping effort. We find that in such
an environment, a positive feedback between shopping and work effort decisions creates a channel by which
inflation can positively influence productive activity. This feature also creates the possibility of multiple steady
state equilibria when household preferences for variety is sufficiently great. We also consider an alternative
means of endogenizing the matching technology through endogenous firm entry. Consistent with the findings
of our basic framework, the importance of search frictions continues to be essential for the non-uniqueness of
equilibria and an additional channel which links money growth to real activity.
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I.  Introduction
The relationship between money growth, inflation, and real activity is a classic and much debated
issue in monetary economics.  Contrary to the Mundell-Tobin view established about three decades ago,
optimal growth models of money tend to favor the conclusion that steady inflation is disruptive to real
economic activity.  For example, monetary growth in cash-in-advance models with production [Stockman
(1981) and Cooley and Hansen (1989)] generates a pure inflation tax effect which discourages market
activities requiring cash.  As a result, consumption, work effort, output, and the capital stock all decline with
the inflation rate.  Under proper conditions, shopping-time and money-in-the-utility-function models also
have a similar prediction [e.g., see a discussion in Wang and Yip (1992)].  However, these approaches
assume an active role of money without much microfoundation.  Thus, one may wonder if their findings are
robust in micro-oriented models which consider the explicit role of money in reducing market frictions of
goods trading.
Why would the consideration of trade frictions matter concerning the issues of the interactions
between the real and the monetary activities?  From a theoretical point of view, trade frictions are necessary
to generate a transactions role for money.  The existing literature consists largely of general equilibrium
models, such as cash-in-advance, which simply approximate these trade frictions in  Walrasian environments
where money is otherwise valueless.  Such theoretic short-cuts will most certainly overlook the potential
effect of money growth and anticipated inflation on the very frictions which give rise to money as a medium
of exchange.  Moreover, from an empirical point of view, evidence pertaining to a consistently negative
relationship between inflation and economic activity is far from conclusive.  While some cross-country
studies and evidence from hyperinflationary episodes [e.g., Fischer(1983), Cooley and Hansen (1989), and
Aiyagari and Eckstein (1994)] detect a negative correlation between inflation and output growth, these
findings may be influenced by the observation that countries with sustained high inflation also experience
￿ As argued by Jones and Manuelli (1995), it may be this variability of high inflation, rather than the
level itself, which generates distortions and disrupts economic activity.

￿In the prototypical search model of money, exchange is characterized by one-for-one swaps of
goods and money, implying fixed prices.  Extensions of the Kiyotaki-Wright model with divisible goods
but indivisible money to include pricing include Trejos and Wright (1993,1995) and Shi (1994). Among
the first to consider the implications of inflation in search-theoretic models of money is Li(1994,1995). 




1   A recent study by Bullard and Keating (1995) finds that a negative money-output
growth correlation is absent from stable price industrialized countries.  These results suggest that additional
study is needed toward understanding the factors underlying the interplays between the real and monetary
activities. 
This paper evaluates the consequences of money growth and inflation on economic activity in the
context of a search-equilibrium model of money that highlights the decentralized and costly nature of the
exchange process.  Search theoretic approaches to monetary theory emphasize that the use of a medium of
exchange minimizes the time or resource costs associated with searching for exchange opportunities, hence
alleviating the "double coincidence of wants" problem with barter.  The seminal work of Kiyotaki and Wright
(1989,1991,1993) formalizes this aspect of monetary exchange in the search-equilibrium paradigm of
Diamond (1982,1984), and provides insights toward understanding the transactive role of money in micro-
oriented models with market frictions.   In our previous work Laing, Li and Wang (1997), we generalize the
Kiyotaki-Wright structure by developing a “multiple-matching” model of money.  Such an approach, while
embodying the “double coincidence of wants” frictions, utilizes an environment which allows us to relax
restrictions on the divisibility and storability of goods and money often imposed in search-theoretic models
of money.
2  This multiple-matching approach to money can be regarded as the basis of the present paper.
The key features of the multiple-matching model that allows us to accomplish our objectives in a
tractable manner are (i) abandoning a sequential search structure and having buyers contact multiple numbers
￿ The main (technical) difficulty behind direct extensions of the Kiyotaki-Wright framework to
include prices and divisible inventories is that it leads to an endogenous distribution of cash and goods
which must be determined jointly with prices.  Recent work attempting to characterize pricing behavior
and the distribution of cash include Green and Zhou (1995), Corbae and Camera (1996), Zhou (1996),
and Molico (1996).  Shi (1997) circumvents the distributional issues with a structure where large
households consist of a continuum of traders.

￿ It should also be noted that our notion of “shopping time” is very different from shopping time
models of money.  In these models money is valued because it directly increases the value of leisure. 
However, while possessing fiat currency in a world where it is generally accepted reduces exchange
costs, it is not immediate why the quantity of money itself saves on these costs.  Our model captures the
notion that shopping time is a costly activity required for exchange.
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of sellers in a given period and (ii) assuming households to possess a preference for consumption variety and
to consume a basket of goods.  This ensures that there is always a subset of goods - with given measure -
among those contacted which the household finds desirable.  This keeps the steady-state distribution of
cash/goods trivial.
3  Search frictions and market incompleteness are captured by limitations in the number
of sellers that buyers can contact in a given period and hence limitations on the variety of goods ultimately
consumed.  An analogy of this process is a consumer who shops in a marketplace and encounters many
different products but not all desired products in the economy.  The model is closed by specifying that prices
are set by monopolistically competitive firms, with each of them selling differentiated products, and by
considering a circular flow of income between households and firms. As illustrated by Laing, Li, and Wang
(1997), the double coincidence problem causes  monetary exchange to improve trading opportunities relative
to barter by increasing consumption variety.
Since the emphasis of this study is on inflation and monetary (rather than barter) exchange, the model
simplifies elements of Laing, Li, and Wang (1997) and extends the approach to focus on a pure-currency
search economy.  In our basic set-up there is a competitive labor market and a product market with random
matching.  In contrast with Laing, Li and Wang (1997) where labor supply is inelastic, this paper allows
households to allocate their time over work effort, shopping time, and leisure.
4  Households supply labor to
firms to receive a cash wage payment and then proceed to the goods market where they are randomly4
matched with a subset of monopolistically competitive, price-setting firms.  It is the choice of shopping time
which endogenizes the matching technology and influences the extent of trade frictions.  Once cash is
exchanged for desired goods, consumption occurs and firms use receipts to finance wage payments.
Upon building-up the multiple-matching model of money with endogenous labor allocation, we
procced with a complete examination of the effects of trade frictions, money growth and steady inflation on
exchange activity, labor allocation, and production decisions.  With a given time allocated to shopping, an
exogenous reduction in trade frictions increases labor supply, overall work effort, and economic activity.
On the other hand, money growth creates an inflation tax inducing a reallocation away from work effort to
leisure.  Similar to conventional models, inflation discourages market activity and real output in this context.
However allowing shopping time and the matching technology to vary in response to the money
growth rate leads to very different conclusions.  In particular, when trade frictions are severe, not only can
money growth and steady inflation encourage both work and shopping effort, but there also exists the
possibility of multiple steady states.  Intuitively, a greater matching rate enlarges consumption variety and
encourages work effort when consumption and leisure are highly substitutable; on the other hand, the higher
labor income generated from work effort encourages the demand for variety and induces shopping time to
increase.  It is precisely the complementarity between work and shopping effort which leads to the possibility
of multiple equilibria.
Finally, we consider an extension of our basic set-up where, while fixing shopping time allocation,
we endogenize the matching technology by introducing firm entry.  We find that by allowing the mass of
firms to affect the matching technology in a way analoguous to Diamond (1982), there generally exists a
positive relationship between household incentives to work and firm entry.  Similarly, firm profits and their
entry decisions are also positively influenced by the household choice of work effort.  It is precisely this
positive feedback which again generates the possibility of multiple steady states.  Furthermore, in our set-up
an increase in the money growth rate encourages firm entry by raising the monopolistic mark-up.  This     
5 This model can support the possibility of a double coincidence of wants and barter between households
and firms by specifying carefully households’ and owners’ preferences over a random subset of goods.  Laing,
Li and Wang (1997) does precisely this, proves the existence of both barter and pure monetary equilibria,
and shows that under some conditions, the pure monetary equilibrium is welfare-enhancing compared to
barter.  Since the present study focuses strictly on the pure monetary equilibrium, the detailed structure to
support fiat currency will not be elaborated.
    
6 This is without loss of generality since it is, as we shall see below, consistent with profit maximization.
Alternatively, we can also consider a more complex environment where households are themselves the
5
provides an additional channel by which inflation can expand consumption variety and increase household
participation in market activity.
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section II will outline the basic model and develop equilibrium
conditions.  It will then characterize and analyze the properties the steady state of the model with both a fixed
matching rate and endogenous shopping time.  Section III extends the basic framework to include an
endogenous determination of firm entry.  Finally, Section IV will conclude with a summary. 
II.  A Multiple Matching Model of Money
Goods, Preferences, and Production
Time is discrete and the economy is populated by a continuum of infinitely lived households
(indexed by h  H) and firms, with each of their masses normalized to unity.  There is a large number of
differentiated commodities of mass one, indexed by   .  Each firm can only produce a particular good
using labor as the sole input so that firms can also be indexed by .  A household of type h desires a variety
of goods over a subset (h)  .  The commodity space is ordered in such a way that a worker of type h,
employed by a particular firm, produces a good outside of his/her preference domain, (h), and thus  there
is no double coincidence of wants between them.
5  In this way, we rule out the uninteresting case of autarky
as well as any possible matches/exchanges between a worker and his/her employer.  As in Diamond-Yellen
(1990), we assume that associated with each firm  is an infinitely lived owner who desires good  and acts
as the residual claimant of the firm’s output.
6  All exchanges occur between households and firms as onlyowners of firms and receive dividend payments via a stock market.

￿This feature of our model contrasts sharply with the traditional search-theoretic framework of
Kiyotaki and Wright.
   
8  For large values of , varieties are closer substitutes.  This type of preferences is standard in the




workers/shoppers are mobile.  Both goods and money are perfectly divisible and agents can store money and
their own production goods in any amount without cost.
7
We make the following assumptions regarding household and firm owner preferences and the
production technology.
Assumption 1: (Household Preferences).  The lifetime utility for household h  H is given by,
where U[] is strictly increasing and quasi-concave in its arguments, and Dt is a composite consumption good
given by
where   (0,1) is the subjective time-discount factor, Lt is leisure at time t, ct() is household consumption
of good , and the composite consumption good captures the preference for consumption variety and has
the constant elasticity form with  > 1 denoting the elasticity of substitution across varieties.
8
Assumption 2: (Firm Owner Preferences).  The owner of firm    has a lifetime utility given by,
(3)
where  is ownership consumption of his own production good.
￿ In the generalized version of the model with barter and monetary exchange, this contract can also
consist of wage payments in the firm’s output.  The composition of this optimal contract between goods
and cash then determines equilibrium trading regimes.  A pure monetary economy is one where this
contract pays only cash wages.
7
(4)
Assumption 3: (Production Technology). The production technology of firm  is given by
where l() is the employment (density) and f satisfies f > 0, f < 0, f(0) = 0 and the Inada conditions, liml60
f(l) =  and liml64 f(l) = 0.
Labor and Product Markets
At the beginning of each period households allocate their time to work effort, lt,  shopping effort, st,
and leisure, Lt = 1 - lt - st.  Household’s possess the ability to produce many types of goods but are only
productive at a single firm per period.  Firm    offers a competitive labor contract to households h  H
which pays a nominal cash wage Wt() in exchange for the household’s labor services lt.
9  Thus, the firm
produces output yt() according to the production technology given by (4).
Once household h  H receive wages from the competitive labor market, they travel to the goods
market in which they are randomly matched with a set of t  (h) firms with measure t.  We make the
following assumption regarding this matching technology:
Assumption 4:  (Matching Technology). The measure of firms contacted by a particular household h is given
by (st), where (st)  0 and (0)  0.  
Thus, t can be thought of as a “matching” rate which measures the severity of search frictions in
the goods market.  It is endogenized by the household investment decision in shopping time.
After matching, trades occur at monetary prices Pt() set by the relevant monopolistically
competitive firms.  Households consume ct() for each   , and firms’ owners consume their residual
output ().
￿￿ This timing of events should not be thought of as a cash-in-advance constraint on firms.  It is the
ex-post outcome of the richer environment of Laing, Li, and Wang (1997) where firms have the option of
accumulating goods for the payment of wages.

￿￿  The liquidity effect literature [Lucas(1990), Fuerst(1992)] motivates a special case of this cash
transfer process where 0 and firms use the additional transfers to finance their wage bill.

￿￿Since each firm is negligible in the continuum, it does not make sense to evaluate the demand for
a single product.  In order to obtain meaningful demand functions, we in essence posit a large
“representative firm” which controls for a positive measure of the commodity space over ’ and sets
prices P’.  Consumer behavior is then defined as the limit case for the measure of ’ to approach zero
such that the deviating firm’s price setting has a negligible impact on each consumer’s wealth.
8

The Money Supply Process
Lump-sum transfers of cash from the monetary authority occur to both households and firms after
the labor market closes but before the goods market opens.  Thus, firms must finance wage payments with
cash receipts accumulated from the previous period’s sales.
10  Let Xt denote this cash transfer, where a
portion Tt = Xt is given to households and  = (1-)Xt is given to firms, with   [0,1].
11  Thus, we can




t + Xt = (1+)M
s
t where  is the money growth rate, and Xt =
Tt + .
Optimization and Equilibrium
In each period, each household of type h is matched with a set of  products with measure  in their
desirable consumption set (h).  Included in this set are firms setting a common monetary price P and a set
of positive measure of deviating firms (denoted by ), with the representative deviating firm (indexed by
) setting a monetary price of P.
12  
The representative household's problem is given by choosing {ct(),ct(),lt,st,Mt+1} to






Mt is the beginning-of-period household money holdings.  With 	t denoting the multiplier associated with




Equations (7) and (8) imply a relationship between c() and c() given by
Substituting this into (6) yields the household’s consumption demands:
 
(12)
Equation (12) implies each consumer's demand, c(), decreases with its price P and at a rate that depends
upon the elasticity of substitution .  An increase in total cash receipts, given by Wtlt + Tt raises the demand10
for all goods proportionately.  The consumer’s preference for variety implies that the share of their income
apportioned to each good declines with the number of trading partners  contacted.
Noting that as the set of deviating firms are arbitrarily small, D/st = /(-1)
1/((-1)(st)ct.  Using




Equation (13) simply equates the marginal disutility of work effort with the marginal utility of consumption
that can be supported by the additional wage income.  Equation (14) says that while work effort raises the
overall level of consumption by the additional real wage, the marginal benefits of shopping time is the
additional variety which can be purchased with a given level of income.  The latter is strictly increasing in
the preference for variety (i.e. decreasing in ).
Finally, from (11) note that a necessary condition for Mt+1 > 0 is given by 	t = 	t+1 or
{UdtDct/UDt+1Dct+1}(Pt+1/Pt) = 1.  This condition implies that the opportunity cost of holding cash (or implicit
nominal interest rate) is zero.  We will impose that this cost be strictly positive, which in the steady state
corresponds to the restriction that  > -1.  Consequently, since the cash transfer occurs before the goods
market opens, the household ends each period with zero money holdings or Mt+1 = 0 	 t.  Thus, the household
chooses an optimal sequence {ct, ct, lt, st} solving (12), (13), and (14) given prices and wage {Pt, Pt, Wt}.
We now consider the optimal price setting behavior of a deviating firm  which takes the price set
by all other firms as given and sets the best response Nash equilibrium price P.  In a pure monetary
equilibrium each owner consumes the residual output of it’s firm so that the firm’s problem is consistent with






contacted in (11) as given and chooses  which solves,
subject to
Inequality (15) is the firm’s resource constraint, and says that output is either consumed or else sold to other
households.  Inequality (16) is the firm’s flow budget constraint requiring that total cash balances at the
beginning of next period cannot exceed the sum of current period money balances,  receipts from sales, and
the monetary transfer less cash wage payments.  Finally, (17) is due to the absence of capital markets, and
indicates that the firm cannot hire more labor than is warranted by its current cash balances.
It is convenient to characterize a stationary equilibrium by scaling all nominal variables by the
beginning-of-period money stock:  
 /Mt
s, wt = Wt/Mt
s, and pt = Pt/Mt
s.  We can write (16) and (17) as:
and express the firm’s value function as12
With (16’) and (17’) strictly binding, the first order conditions, given in the Appendix, yields a Nash
equilibrium in the price-setting game where
	
Intuitively, the monopolistic markup of price over next period wages depends negatively on  and next
period’s marginal productivity.  Since firms must finance wage payments with cash receipts carried over
from last period, the marginal cost of hiring labor, and hence the markup, is increasing with the inflation rate
.  As   -1 and   , the conventional result emerges in that the inverse markup approaches the
marginal productivity of labor.  
The firm chooses an optimal sequence {pt ,  t,  } solving (15), (17'), and (18) given prices  and
wages {pt, wt}.  Labor and money market clearing implies that lt =   and that  =  = 1.  We now
characterize the steady state of the economy’s equilibrium in which no firm would deviate.








 where w* = 1/l*, L* = 1 - l* - s*, and
Notice that a convenient way of expressing condition (21) is by substituting in (19), (20) and (21) and writing
it in terms of the ratio of the elasticity of substitution of leisure to composite consumption
where 
 
 L/D and L = ULL, D = DDD.
Properties Steady State Equilibria
This section analyzes the existence of steady state equilibria and investigates the model’s steady state
implications for money growth, inflation, and real activity.  First, we will consider equilibria with a fixed
shopping effort and matching rate. Then we consider the general model which allows shopping effort to vary
optimally.
For convenience, and to make our analysis more concrete, we will adopt some specific functional
forms for preferences and technology.  In particular, let f(l) = lN, consider a linear matching technology (s)=
0 + 1s, 0, 1  0, and let preferences be given by U(D,L) = [DD +  (1-)LD]
1/D, where   (0,1) and 
 [0,1].  This CES specification embodies both the linear case where   1 and the Cobb Douglas case where14
(25)
  0.  It implies that the elasticity of substitution ratio is given by 
 = {(1-)/}(L/D)D.  With this,
condition (24) is given by
Equilibria with a Fixed Matching Technology
In order to highlight the essential role of endogenous shopping effort and matching, we begin by
considering the case where the matching rate is fixed at  = 0 > 0 and hence s* = 0. Then we have:
Proposition 1.  Given  = 0, there exists a unique steady state equilibrium {c*,p*,l*,D*} solving (19), (20),
(21) and (23).
Proof: From (25) a sufficient condition for this is that (l/DD) is strictly increasing in l.  Substituting in (23)
gives
Thus, (l/DD)/l > 0 and there exists a unique l* satisfying (24).  With this, (22), gives D* and (19) and (20)
gives p* = [/(-1)] [(1+)/f (l*)] and c* = [(-1)/] [(1+)/(1+)] [f (l*)l*/0] . 
Consider now the impact of an exogenous increase in the matching rate 0 and money growth rate
:
Proposition 2.  (Effect of Trade Frictions and Money Growth) The pure monetary equilibrium with  = 0
possesses the following properties:
(i)  l*/0 > 0,  D*/0 > 0,  (w/p)*/0 < 0, and  p*/0 < 0;
(ii) l*/ < 0,  D*/ < 0,  (w/p)*/ < 0, and  p*/ > 0.
Proof: To prove part (i), we substitute (23) into (25) to yield the equilibrium locus determining l*:15
(26)
Since the right hand side of (26) is strictly decreasing in l and increasing in 0, l*/ 0 > 0.  From (23), D
is increasing in both 0 and l so that D*/0 > 0.  From (19) w*/p* = [/(-1)] f(l*)/(1+)
and thus (w/p)*/0 < 0.  Finally, since f(l)l is increasing in l, p*/0 < 0.
For part (ii), it is immediate from (26) that a higher money growth rate increases the left hand side
while reducing the right hand side.  As the right hand side of (26) is strictly decreasing in l, it must be that
l*/ < 0.  Since D is increasing in l from (22), D*/  < 0.  From (19) a decreasing l* implies a higher
nominal wage and lower marginal product and this gives p*/  > 0.  From (21) and CES preferences, note
that (w/p)* = [(1-)/][D*/(1-l)]
1-D; as  discourages D* and work effort, (w/p)*/  < 0. 
Intuitively, an increase in the matching rate increases the marginal benefit of wage income, as it is
able to purchase more consumption variety.  This shifts labor supply out and lowers the equilibrium real
wage.  The resultant increase in equilibrium work effort and matching rate increases real incomes and
composite consumption.  
Moreover, money growth creates an inflation tax effect which, for a given matching rate, decreases
both labor demand and supply and equilibrium work effort.  Real money balances used to finance labor
declines and lower real incomes reduces composite consumption.  For  > 0, beginning-of-period cash
transfers to households create a positive wealth effect which reinforces the decline in work effort.  The
inflation tax effect on work effort is consistent with many standard general equilibrium models which predict
a negative relationship between inflation and market activity.  However, as we shall see below, the ability
of traders in the economy to affect the “frequency” of exchange opportunities and the extent of search




Equilibria with Endogenous Shopping Effort
Having endowed with the findings in an economy with exogenous shopping effort and a fixed
matching rate, we are now ready to characterize pure monetary equilibrium in the general model outlined in
Section II, where  = (s) = 0 + 1s.  For a given shopping time allocation s, equation (25) corresponds to
an efficiency condition for optimal work effort.  Substituting (23) into (25) gives the LL locus:
For a given work effort allocation l, equation (22) corresponds to an efficiency condition for optimal
shopping effort.  Substituting (20) into (222) gives the SS locus:
A steady state can be characterized by {l*,s*} satisfying (27) and (28).  These conditions lead to the
following:
Lemma 1.  (Characterization of LL and SS Loci)
(i) For   0 sufficiently small, dl/dsLL < 0, for  = 1, dl/dsLL > 0, and there exists values of 0 < 
< 1 such that dl/dsLL > 0 for s <  < 1-l and dl/dsLL < 0 for   < s < 1.
(ii) The SS locus is strictly increasing in the (s,l) space: dl/dsSS > 0.
Proof: See the Appendix. 
The LL locus denotes the optimal response of work effort to a change in shopping effort.  For 
sufficiently large, a greater substitutability between composite consumption and leisure implies that an
exogenous increase in s raises the marginal benefits of work effort and causes a substitution towards
composite consumption.  For  sufficiently small, less substitutability between composite consumption and17
leisure implies that an exogenous increase in s will actually reduce incentives for work effort as households
substitutes towards leisure.  The SS locus denotes the optimal response of shopping effort to a change in
work effort.  An exogenous increase in work effort lowers the marginal benefit of labor supply and, at the
optimum, this must be equated with the marginal benefits of shopping effort.  Since consumption per type,
c*, is strictly decreasing in s, an increase in shopping effort is necessary.
In light of these properties, we can divide the characterization of equilibria into several cases and
analyze the effects of search frictions and inflation for each.
Proposition 3.  Given  > 0 sufficiently small, there exists a unique steady state equilibrium {l*,s*}
satisfying:
(i) l*/0 > 0 and s*/0 < 0;
(ii) l*/ < 0 for any value of  and s*/ < 0 for  sufficiently small.
Proof: See the Appendix. 
The uniqueness of steady state equilibria comes from Lemma 1, which verified that the SS-locus is
strictly upward sloping while for   0 sufficiently small, the LL locus is strictly downward sloping.
Intuitively, a reduction in trade frictions, as captured by an increase in 0, generates a positive wealth effect
that causes households to lower shopping effort and a substitution effect towards work effort.  The SS locus
shifts upwards in the (s,l) plane as shown in Figure 1A.  For  > 0, the LL locus also shifts upwards, re-
inforcing the positive impact on work effort but mitigating somewhat the negative impact on shopping time.
Consequently, there is an increase in composite consumption and real balances, and real wages decline from
the increase in labor supply.
Figure 1B illustrates the unique steady state and shows that an increase in  shifts both the LL and
SS loci downward.  Both the inflation tax effect on work effort and the substitution away from work towards
shopping time lowers equilibrium work effort, but the impact on steady state shopping effort becomes
ambiguous.  Notice that if  = 0 and  = 0, both l* and s* are invariant to the money growth rate, and if 
￿￿Higher money growth with  > 0 will create a positive wealth effects to households; however, this
is an artifact of the feature that households are not required to hold cash across periods.  Since such
wealth effects are likely to be small in practice, we interpret  sufficiently small as a more “natural”
specification of the model.
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is sufficiently small while  is small but positive, then steady state shopping time also falls as households
substitute away from market activity.
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Proposition 4. For  = 1, there exists a unique steady state {l*,s*} satisfying: 
(i) s*/0 < 0 and l*/0 = 0;
(ii) s*/ < 0 and l*/ < 0 for -1 > 1/(1-);
(iii) s*/ > 0 and l*/ > 0 for 1 < -1 < 1/(1-).
Proof: See Appendix. 
Recall that with  sufficiently large, both the SS and LL locus are upward sloping.  An increase in
0 tends to reduce the optimal choice of s for a given l, shifting the SS locus upward in the (s,l) plane.  This
is the pure wealth effect of the improved matching technology .  However, it also increases the optimal
choice of l given s, shifting the LL locus upward.  While both effects lead to a reduction in shopping time,
the impact on work effort depends upon whether or not the substitution effect of 0 outweighs the wealth
effect.  In the linear example where  = 1, these effects exactly cancel and there is no overall change in either
the overall matching rate, (s), or equilibrium work effort (see Figure 2).
A greater money growth rate lowers work effort for a given shopping effort, shifting the LL locus
downward in the (s,l) plane.  This is the negative wealth effect of the inflation tax.  For  sufficiently large,
equilibria occrs where the SS locus is steeper LL and the decline in work effort lowers the marginal
incentives to invest in shopping effort (see Figure 3B illustrates the case where  = 0 for convenience).
Notice that from (23) composite consumption D* falls, and, since UL/UD is a constant, (21) implies an
increase in real wages as the marginal product of labor rises.  Intuitively, if the preference for variety is small,
and hence search frictions are not important, inflation decreases investment in shopping time, employment,19
and economic activity.
However, for  sufficiently small, steady state occurs where the LL locus will be steeper than SS
and the decline in work effort creates a substitution towards shopping effort.  Consequently, the resulting
increase in the matching rate increases the marginal benefits of wage income and the incentive to increase
labor supply.  It is precisely this positive feedback which can lead to an overall increase in work effort and
employment (see Figure 3A for the case where  = 0).  Intuitively, if the preference for variety is large, and
hence search frictions are important, then inflation can increase shopping time, employment, and economic
activity.  In this case an increase in the money growth rate increases composite consumption, D*, and lowers
the real wage rate.  This result is in stark contrast to the model which simply assumes a fixed matching rate.
Proposition 5.  (Multiple Equilibria) For 0 <  < 1, multiple (non-degenerate) steady states may emerge,
under which 
(i) equilibria can be ranked by a monotone increasing relationship between l* and s*;
(ii) for  sufficiently small, sign{l*/} = sign{s*/}, and there will be at least one equilibria with
l*/  > 0 and s*/ > 0.
Proof:  This proposition can be verified graphically.  Consider the case where the LL locus is upward sloping
for s small and downward sloping for s large.  Since the SS locus is upward sloping and all equilibria must
occur along it, (i) is immediate.  Since SS is linear, if LL is steeper than SS at the origin, then there is either
a unique equilibria [described by Proposition 3 or Proposition 4(ii)] or an odd number of steady states (Figure
4A).  Since a higher money growth rate shifts the entire LL locus downward, movement of equilibria along
the SS locus implies l* and s* must move in the same direction and for 2n-1, n  2,  steady states implies that
n - 1 of those equilibria will be characterize by l*/  > 0 and s*/ > 0.  If SS is steeper than LL close
to the origin, there is at least two steady states or, in general, an even number (Figure 4B).  Again, a higher
money growth rate shifts SS downward, implying that l* and s* must move together.  Furthermore, for every
equilibria where l*/ < 0 and s*/ < 0, there exists one where l*/  > 0 and s*/ > 0.  20
The possibility of multiple equilibria arises from the complementarity between the optimal choices
of work and shopping effort.  Intuitively, a greater matching rate enlarges consumption variety and
encourages work effort when goods and leisure are highly substitutable.  On the other hand, the higher labor
income generated from work effort encourages demand for variety and induces shopping time to increase.
When the elasticity of substitution between goods and leisure is moderately high and the preference for
consumption variety is sufficiently great, there exists nonlinear positive interactions between employment
and shopping time which generate a multiplicity of non-degenerate steady states.
As an illustration of the existence of multiple equilibria, consider  = 2,  = 0.4,  = 0.8,  = 0.8,
0 = 0, 1 = 8,  = 0.99.  Figure 6 plots the roots of (27) as a function of l, where s has been substituted out
from (28).  For  = 0, it indicates that there is a low output equilibria, where l = 0.104 and s = 0.208 and a
high output equilibria, where l = 0.313 and s = 0.626.  Raising the inflation rate to  = 0.10 increases work
and shopping effort in the low output equilibria to 0.125 and 0.256 and reduces work and shopping effort
in the high output equilibria to 0.298 and 0.609.
One may now wonder in cases of multiple equilibria if some are stable and some are not.  Obviously,
by the nature of the LL and SS loci, stability cannot be analyzed graphically since the evolution of quantities
(consumption and labor allocation) and prices (contemporaneous goods prices, wages and the intertemporal
price) cannot be simply summarized in (s, l)-space.  Moreover, even one may analyze those quantity and
price dynamics, the complete analysis cannot be done with including the change of values in the Bellman
equations. If one does so, then, by the nature of self-fulfilling expectations, there is always a bubble-type
hyperinflationary transition path leading to the barter equilibrium.  Thus, the only alternative remaining is
to apply the Samuelson Correspondence Principle to examine the ad hoc dynamics by Liaponov functions.
In this latter sense any (and indeed all) equilibria described in Proposition 5 may be stable.  Thus, we have
proceeded with discussion of the comparative-static properties of each type of equilibria.
Notice that these results differ dramatically from those obtained in the case of exogenous shopping21
effort and matching.  In particular, the introduction of endogenous shopping and matching (i) permits the
possibility of multiple equilibria and (ii) generates ambiguity concerning the effect of money growth on work
effort.  We also want to call the reader’s attention that preference over variety is essential for the emergence
of multiple non-degenerate steady states.  When differentiated goods are perfect substitutes (i.e.,   ), it
is clear from (26) that  the positive feedback effect between work and shopping effort via matching ()
vanishes.  In this case, the LL locus is always downward-sloping, regardless of the degree of substitution
between goods and leisure.  This, together with the positively sloped SS locus, results in a unique non-
degenerate steady-state equilibrium.
III.  Firm Entry and Trade Frictions
In this extension, we consider an alternative method of endogenizing the matching technology.
Previously, we have always normalized the measure of firms to be unity; this section considers the issue of
optimal firm entry and how it’s interaction with the matching technology affects the properties of steady state
equilibria.  To isolate this effect, we fix the shopping time allocation decision exogenously so that s = 0.  We
normalize the measure of households to unity and let Nt  + denote the measure of firms, where each firm
possesses production technology (4).  The following assumption modifies the matching technology by
relating the measure of firms contacted by each household to the total measure of firms participating in the
market.
Assumption 4’:  (Matching Technology) The measure of firms contacted by a particular household h is given
by (Nt), where (Nt) > 0 and (0) = 0.
The money supply process is identical to the previous section, with monetary transfer Tt = Xt given
to households and  = (1-)Xt is given to firms, implying  /Nt is the transfer per firm.  We will focus on
symmetric steady states where cash balances will be identical across all firms in each period.  Without loss
of generality, a money supply process consistent with such a symmetric steady state is one where each22
entering firm recieves a cash transfer from the central bank in an amount which replicates the money
balances of the existing fims in the market.  This will allow entering firms to finance their wage payment.
The transfer can then be rebated from these entrants in the following period.  The transfer and rebate process
works analogously for exiting firms.  Since households take the matching technology and money supply
process as given, the choice of  {ct(),ct(),lt,,Mt+1} maximizing (1) subject to (5) must continue to satisfy




  The deviating firm chooses  to maximize (3) subject to (17’),
where nominal variables have once again been scaled by the aggregate beginning-of-period money stock Mt
s.
Notice that this alteration in the matching technology scales both the marginal benefits and costs of setting
a particular deviating price by equal proportions so that the symmetric Nash optimal pricing rule continues
to be given by (18).
To close the model, firm entry is introduced by imposing a fixed per-period firm entry cost of  >






Labor and money market clearing implies that lt/Nt =   and  = 1/Nt.  Thus, a symmetric steady
state equilibrium with firm entry, with p = p’= p* and c = c’ = c* is given by {c*,l*,N*,m*} and prices
{p*,w*} satisfying (29), (30), (18), (31), m* = 1/N*, and w* = 1/l*.  Substituting (29) and (18) into (30)
gives us an LL-locus indicating the optimal choice of l for a given measure of firms N:
Substituting (29) and (18) into (31) gives an EE-locus indicating the optimal firm entry condition for a given
household choice of l:
Thus, a steady state can be characterized as a pair {N*,l*} satisfying (32) and (33).  We again adopt the
Cobb-Douglas form for the production technology and a linear matching technology where (N) = N, 
< 1.  With this, it is immediate that the EE-locus is increasing and linear in the (N,l) space as (33) can be
written as:
The following proposition characterizes the LL-locus:
Lemma 2.  (Characterization of LL Locus)  The LL-locus possesses the following properties:
(i) for  = 0, dl/dNLL = 0 and l* = [1+(1-)(1+)/]
-1;24
(ii) for  = 1, dl/dNLL > 0, l(N)  0 as N  0, and the LL-locus is strictly convex in the (N,l) space;
(iii) for 0 <  < 1, dl/dNLL > 0, l(N)  0 as N  0, and l(N)  1 as N becomes arbitrarily large.
Proof: See Appendix. 
Lemma 2 implies that for the Cobb-Douglas case, where the ratio of the elasticity of substitution between
consumption and leisure is independent of the matching technology, steady state work effort l* will be
constant and independent of N.  For all 0 <   1, an increase in the measure of firms increases the set of
firms households are matched with and hence enhances product variety.  This increases the opportunity cost
of leisure to consumption and households substitute towards work effort.  The following propositions now
characterize the properties of steady state equilibria.
Proposition 5.  For  = 0, there exists a unique steady state equilibrium satisfying:
(i) l*/ < 0;
(ii) N*/ > 0 for  sufficiently small and N*/ < 0 for   sufficiently large. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
The uniqueness of the steady state is immediate since, from Lemma 2, the LL locus is horizontal
while the EE locus is upward sloping.  Again, for  > 0, it is the positive wealth effect on households from
cash transfers which lowers steady state work effort.  The inflation tax effect on work effort is absent in the
Cobb-Douglas case where the ratio of the elasticity of substitution of leisure to consumption is constant.
This is immediate seen by noting that as   0, work effort becomes invariant to the money growthrate.
However, in the case where  is sufficiently small, a higher money growth rate raises the firm’s markup of
prices over marginal costs, encourages firm entry, and expands the steady state measure of firms.
Proposition 7.  For  = 1, there exists a unique steady state where  l*/ > 0 and N*/ > 0.
Proof: See Appendix. 
Existence of a unique steady state arises from the increasing and convex LL locus.  The impact of
an increase in the money growth rate is illustrated in Figure 6.  Just as in the Cobb-Douglas case, a higher25
money growth rate increases the monopolist mark-up and leads to firm entry, for a given choice of work
effort per household.  This is represented by a shift of the EE locus to the right.  Furthermore, money growth
now generates an inflation tax effect which discourages work effort and causes households to substitute
towards leisure.  This shifts the LL locus to the right.  Consequently, if leisure and composite consumption
are very close substitutes, the firm entry effect and it’s positive impact on the matching technology dominates
this inflation tax effect.  Thus, as trade frictions are reduced, the result is greater steady state work effort and
firm entry.  While labor input per firm  (l*/N*) diminishes, aggregate real activity increases as measured by
N*f(l*/N*) increases.
Proposition 8.  Suppose 0 <  < 1.  Then
(i) for   > 1/(1-) there exists a unique non-degenerate steady state where l*/ < 0, and for 
sufficiently large N*/ < 0;









that  l1*/ > 0,  l2*/ < 0, N1*/ > 0, and for  sufficiently large N2*/ < 0. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
The uniqueness of steady state requires that the preference for variety is small ( large), or
consumption and leisure are not very close substitutes ( small).  In this case,  the LL locus is strictly
concave in (N,l) space and the unique steady state is illustrated in Figure 8.  An increase in the money growth
rate leads households to substitute away from work effort and shifts the LL locus downward.  The higher
monopolist mark-up leads firms to enter the market for a given per household choice of labor supply, and
shifts the EE-locus downward.  The overall impact is a decline in steady state work effort, but the impact on
steady state firm entry depends upon the share of the monetary transfer going to firms.  If this share is
sufficiently small ( large), then the wealth effect on households reinforces the negative impact on work
effort and leads to an overall decline in the measure of firms.
However, if there is a sufficient preference for variety ( > 1 small) or consumption and leisure are26
highly substitutable in household utility ( < 1 sufficiently large), then there will be multiple (two) equilibria.
As shown in Figure 7, these equilibria can be ranked by real activity, since along the EE locus, labor per firm
is constant.  Intuitively, preferences for variety and the importance of trade frictions are necessary in
generating multiple equilibria.  All else being equal, higher inflation again causes households to substitute
towards leisure, shifting the LL locus downward, and encourages firm entry, shifting EE downward.  The
overall impact on the steady state will thus differ across equilibria.  For the low activity equilibria, both work
effort and the measure of firms increases while for the high activity equilibria, work effort declines and if
there is a sufficiently large wealth effect to households from the cash transfer, firm entry will decline as well.
We can also analyze the impact of a direct reduction in search frictions, captured by increasing the
fraction of firms contacted per household, , on real activity.  Notice from (32) that an increase in 
increases the work effort choice and shifts the LL locus upwards.  In the unique steady state case where 
> 1/(1-), we have  l*/ > 0 and N*/ > 0.  For  < 1/(1-), l1*/ < 0,  l2*/ > 0, N1*/ < 0,
and  N2*/ > 0.  This suggests that for the multiple equilibrium case the impact of an increase in the
productivity of the matching technology depends upon the level of real activity.  If the number of firms
matched to each household is sufficiently large, as in the low activity equilibria, then a substitution effect
dominates and households shift towards work effort and market activity.  Notice when  < 1/(1-) and 0 <
 < 1, the properties of each of the two steady states correspond to the unique steady state cases analyzes
previously.  In particular, the properties of the low activity equilibria are analogous to the unique steady state
case when  = 1.  Also, the properties of the high activity equilibria are analogous to the unique steady which
arises with  > 1/(1-) and 0 <  < 1.
An overall examination of the cases of endogenous shopping effort and endogenous firm entry
indicates that the main findings are qualitatively similar.  In either case, multiple equilibria may emerge,
while monetary growth may have positive effects on work effort.  However, the endogenous entry model has
an advantage in terms of welfare analysis.  Specifically, by free entry, firms always reach zero profit in27
equilibrium and as a concequence, welfare evaluation only depends on consumer’s lifetime utility.
Staighforward manipulations show that consumer’s welfare may be hump-shaped.  When the money growth
rate is low, the positive endogenous entry effect dominates the standard negative purchasing power effect
via consumption reduction.  Thus, an increase in the money growth rate (or anticipated inflation rate) leads
to an improvement in welfare.  When the money growth rate is high, the negative purchasing power effect
becomes the dominant factor and a negative relationship between money growth and welfare is therefore
anticipated.  This Laffer-curve shaped welfare schedule with respect to changes in money growth suggests
that in the presence of trade frictions and endogenous firm entry, there may be a positive rate of optimal
inflation and the Friedman rule need not hold up in general.
IV.  Conclusion
This paper has investigated implications of a multiple matching model of money for the effects of
monetary growth and inflation on economic activity.  The use of a multiple matching technique, where search
frictions are captured by limited consumption variety, allows the model to generalizes various aspects of the
traditional money-search literature, including price determination and the divisibility and storability of goods
and money.  We find that in both the basic framework with endogenous shopping effort and in an alternative
specification where frim entry is endogenized, trade frictions are an important element in generating multiple
steady states and providing a channel by which monetary growth positively influences real activity.  These
features exist in the absence of increasing returns of the matching technology or search externalities. 
This finding is also complementary to some earlier work by Li (1994, 1995) evaluating the
consequences of inflation in search-theoretic models of money.  In a fixed price indivisible search model of
money of Kiyotaki and Wright (1993), these papers concluded that a tax on money balances can indeed
positively influence search activity, stimulate the accumulation of inventories, and increase welfare.  Our28
paper suggests that these conclusions may not have been just an artifact of the indivisible nature of fiat
money and inventory restrictions assumed by these models and are robust to generalizations to the search
environment. 
The possibility of multiple steady states suggests that the lack of strong empirical evidence
supporting a positive or negative impact of steady inflation in industrialized countries may be the result of
an economy in transition across multiple equilibria.  However, our steady state analysis cannot address the
stability of these steady states and the transitional dynamic response to changes in the money growth rate.
Given our results, this undertaking appears to be a fruitful avenue for future work.
This paper demonstrates that search theoretic models of money with multiple matching can be
extended and applied to a wide variety of issues in monetary economics.  For example, a saving and
investment decision can be incorporated into the model by the inclusion of productive capital.  Such a
framework can then begin to address the issue of how monetary growth impacts the capital stock and whether
there exists a Mundell-Tobin effect.  Also, the model can be useful in analyzing the extent by which inflation
distorts relative prices across markets with varying degrees of search frictions.  Finally, an incorporation of
a credit market will allow the model to study the transmission of monetary policy, whether such a model can
capture the liquidity effects of monetary shocks, and their implications for the cyclical behavior of real
variables.29
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APPENDIX
Firm’s First Order Conditions
Letting  be the multiplier associated with (17’) and assuming the constraints are strictly binding, the firm’s
first order conditions for   and pt can be written as:
and where, from (12), ct/pt = -ct/pt.  The envelope condition is given by
Proofs to Propositions
Lemma 1.
(i)  Notice that the left hand side of (27) is independent of l and s.  The right hand side of (27) can be
written as
Thus, the right hand side is strictly decreasing in l [d(RHSLL)/dl<0].  Differentiating this expression
with respect to s gives
For  = 0, this expression is strictly negative, implying dl/dsLL < 0, and for  = 1, this expression
is strictly positive, implying dl/dsLL > 0.  We also see that (i) if (A1) is positive at s = 0, then there
exists a unique  < 1-l, such that (A1) is positive for s <  , implying dl/dsLL > 0 and negative for
s >  , implying dl/dsLL < 0, and (ii) if (A1)is negative at s = 0, which is true for  > 0 sufficiently
small, then (A1) is negative for all s > 0, implying  dl/dsLL < 0.32
(A6)
(A7)
(ii) From (28), a sufficient condition for dl/dsSS > 0 is given by (s)  0.  This is certainly satisfied
with our linear matching technology, which implies an increasing and linear SS locus. 
Proposition 3.
Consider the limiting case where  = 0, the Cobb-Douglas case.  Equations (27) and (28) can be written as
(A2)
(A3)
Since the (LL) locus in (A2) is downward sloping while the (SS) locus in (A3) in upward sloping in the (s,l)
plane, there exists a unique steady state {l*,s*}.  From Proposition 4, LL is also strictly downward sloping
for  > 0 sufficiently small which also guarantees uniqueness.
For  = 0, (A3) indicates that an increase in 0 increases l and shifts SS upwards. As a result,s*/0 < 0,
l*/0 > 0.  For  sufficiently small, the LL locus will shift right, re-inforcing the positive impact on l*
while mitigating the negative impact on s*.  From (28), the overall matching rate  increases.
To analyze the effect of an increase in money growth , when  = 0, substituting (A3) into (A2) gives
(A4)
For  > 0, since the right hand side of (A4) is increasing in  and decreasing is s, s*/ > 0 and from (A2),
l*/ < 0.  For  = 0, l* and s* are invariant with respect to .  Now consider the case where  > 0 but
small.  s*/ will generally be ambiguous but negative for  sufficiently small.
Proposition 4.  Consider the limiting case where  = 1, the linear specification.  Equations (27) can be
written as 
(A5)
and (28) is given by (A3).  Since the right hand side of (A5) is strictly increasing in s and decreasing in l,
both the SS and LL locus are upward sloping in the (s,l) plane.  By substituting (A3) into (A5) we can verify
a unique steady state given by 33
where E 
 [(1-)/][/(-1)]N/[1
1-N] and   
 (-1)/[1-(-1)(1-)].  
(i) It is immediate that s*/0 = -1/1 < 0 and l*/0 = 0.  
(ii) Consider the case where  < 0, which is guaranteed for a sufficiently large (-1) > 1/(1-).  From
(A6) it is clear that s*/ < 0.  From (28) it is immediate that l*/ < 0.
(iii) Next, consider the case where  > 0, which is guaranteed for a sufficiently small (-1) < 1/(1-).
From (A6) it is clear that s*/ > 0.  To analyze the impact on work effort, notice from (A7) that
a sufficient condition for l*/ > 0 for all  is given by l*/ > 0 for  = 1. Take the limiting
case where  = 1, the exponential on (1+) becomes  - 1, which is positive for (-1) > 1,
implying l*/ > 0, and negative for (-1) < 1, implying l*/ < 0.
Lemma 2.
(i) For  = 0, (32) can be written as (1-)(1+)/ = (1-l)/l and the LL-locus can be written as l = [1+(1-
)(1+)/]
-1.
(ii) For  = 1, (32) can be written as
Thus, l(0) = 0, dN/dl > 0 and since [/(-1)-]/(1-) > 1, d
2N/dl > 0 and the LL-locus is increasing
and strictly convex in the (N,l) space.
(iii) For 0 <  < 1, (32) implies that for f<0 and  > 0, dl/dN > 0.  Also, since f 0 as l/N   and f
 as l/N  0, it is clear that the LL locus passes through the origin in the (N,l) space and l  1 as N
 . 
Proposition 6.  From Proposition 8,  l* = [1+(1-)(1+)/]
-1, and it is immediate that l*/ < 0 for  >
0.  Substituting this into (34) gives the unique steady state value for N*,
For   1 we have N*/ < 0 and for   0 we have N*/ > 0. 
Proposition 7.  From Proposition 8, uniqueness of the steady state is gauranteed by convexity of the LL-
locus in (N,l) space.  For  = 1, (32) becomes34
(A8)

Substituting in (34) and simplifying gives
where  = /(-1) - 1.  Notice that for  = 1, the right-hand side of (A8) is strictly decreasing in  while
increasing in l.  Hence l*/ > 0.  A sufficient condition for this to be true for all   [0,1] is for the right-
hand side of (A8) to be decreasing in  at  = 0.  To verify this, notice that the RHS of (A8) is proportional
to [1-z/x]R/x, where x 
 1+ and z
 (-1)/.  Differentiating this w.r.t. x gives that d(RHS)/d < 0 iff
z/x(1-z.x)
-1 > 1 or  < 1+.  This condition is true by supposition that  >  - 1.  Therefore l*/ > 0 for
all .  From (34) it is immediate that N*/ > 0. 
Proposition 8.  The LL locus in (32) can be written as
Substituting in (32) gives
where  = /(-1) - 1.  Notice that if /(-1) - (1-) < 0, or  > 1/(1-), the LHS of (A9) is strictly
decreasing in l while the RHS is a constant.  This verifies the uniqueness of the steady state for  sufficiently
small or  sufficiently large.  If  < 1/(1-), then it can be verified that the LHS of (A9) is parabolic, zero
when l = 0, and attains a unique maximum at [/(-1) - (1-)] [/(-1)]
-1 < 1.  Thus, for  < 1/(1-), there
exists two steady states {l1*,l2*} where l1* < l2*.
To evaluate the impact of money growth, notice that a sufficient condition for the RHS of (A9) to be
increasing in  for all   [0,1] is d(RHS)/d > 0 for  = 0.  Setting  = 0, notice that RHS is proportional
to x(1-z/x)
-R, where x 
1+ and z
 (-1)/.  From the proof to Proposition 10, this expression is
increasing in  for  < 1+, and this condition is true by supposition.  Therefore, for   > 1/(1-) where
there is a unique steady state, l*/ < 0 and, form (34), l*/N < 0 for  sufficiently large.  For  < 1/(1-)
where there are two steady states,  l1*/ > 0,  l2*/ < 0, and from (32) N1*/ > 0, and N2*/ < 0
for  sufficiently large. 35
  FIGURE 1A - Steady State for  > 0 sufficiently small
and Effect of an Increase in 0
FIGURE 1B - Steady State for  > 0 sufficiently small
and Effect of an Increase in 
FIGURE 2 -36
Steady State for  = 1
and Effect of an Increase in 037
FIGURE 3A - Steady State for  = 1, -1 < 1/(1-)
and Effect of an Increase in 
FIGURE 3B - Increase in  for  = 1, -1 > 1/(1-)38
FIGURE 4A - Multiple Equilibria (Odd Number)
and Effect of an Increase in 
FIGURE 4B - Multiple Equilibria (Even Number)
















FIGURE 5 - Existence of Multiple Steady States with
=2, =0.4, =0.8, 0=0, 1=8 and =0.99.
FIGURE 6 - Steady State with Firm Entry for =1
and Effect of Increase in .40
FIGURE 7 - Steady State with Frim Entry for 0 <  < 1,
and  > 1/(1-).  Effect of Increase in .
FIGURE 8 - Multiple Steady States with Firm Entry for 0 <  < 1
and  < 1/(1-).  Effect of Increase in .